Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb

Oh the apoplectic comments we'll hear if a pro-nuke Newsweek think-piece should appear.

CJCS’s Searing Critique

Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has an article in the most recent Joint Force Quarterly regarding strategic communication called Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics. The New York Times called it a “searing critique” while another headline praised Mullen for (finally) elevating the strategic communication debate above the third grade level.

Not to be confused with social media like blogs, Facebook, and Twitter, strategic communication is significantly different. It even warrants a spot in the Joint Dictionary, where strategic communication is defined as “Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.”

In short order, Admiral Mullen’s article first says ‘we’re awful’ (my paraphrase) and then advises us to get back to basics, where “we can start by not beating ourselves up.” He then proceeds to beat everyone up. While the article is only about 1300-words, in it Mullen invokes the word “we” around 25 times. In context, he appears to apply “we” to the U.S. military in about 20 of those usages and to the American people in general about three times. However, the tone of “we” as it seems to apply to the military is one of failure. Here are many of the descriptions: we have walked away; we have allowed; we need to; we haven’t invested; we haven’t always delivered; we know better; we could learn; we must know; we hurt ourselves; we must be vigilant; we don’t fully--and don’t always attempt to--understand; we must listen; we should use; we need to worry; we (need to) learn to be more humble, and; we need more…credibility.

Admiral Mullen says our messages lack credibility because we lack credibility and he says the reason we lack credibility is because 1) we haven’t built trust or relationships and 2) because we haven’t always delivered on promises. As the article is written by Admiral Mullen in his role as the U.S. armed forces senior ranking member, and because it appears in JFQ (as well as on the JCS web site) for a largely military audience, it certainly seems the “we” is focused on the military, which after all, owns strategic communication and would be the target for these shortcomings.

Admiral Mullen’s article reflects the universal truth that actions speak louder than words. However, since the article itself is a critique on strategic communication, it warrants being unpacked a little more. For example, there are several photos in the article and in them, what do we see? We see the Admiral addressing the media and we see him interviewing with CNN. However, in the text, he offers the advice “We hurt ourselves and the message we try to send when it appears we are doing something merely for the credit,” the quote appears right above a photo of Mullen (see top of post) handing out notebooks at an Afghan girls’ school. Is it me?

What was missing from the article was the ‘Here is what we’re going to do about it’ part. Other than the vague requirement to ‘build trust and relationships and deliver on promises,’ I didn’t see much about what to do, let alone how to do it. In fact, in that sense, the article was very reminiscent of one he penned a year ago for JFQ called It’s Time for a New Deterrence Model. In that article, again clocking in at 1300-words (I think I see a pattern), the phrase “we must” appeared ten times and the Admiral presented a world-class to-do list. Included in its “we must” listings were: revitalize; hold ourselves accountable; recruit; manage; act proportionally; address our conventional force structure; enhance our capability to rapidly locate and destroy targets; conduct sufficient contingency planning; improve conventional global strike capability; stay engaged globally. All these "we musts" tend to imply "we aren't."

Knowing we’re in a swamp is one thing. Remembering what we came to the swamp to do is another. Providing the illuminating vision to do that job is another still.

Happy Birthday Kellogg-Brand Pact!

On this day in 1928, the Kellogg-Brand Pact was signed. The pact initially included France and Germany (and 13 others including the U.S.). It was signed in Paris and was ratified by the U.S. Senate 85 to 1.

The pact's signatories agreed that all future conflicts would be settled using peaceful means and likewise renounced war as an instrument of policy.

A little less than twelve years later, German troops occupied Paris.

Mail-in the QDR?

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is a legislatively mandated review of DoD strategy and priorities. Some in Congress feel the QDR has been used to avoid DoD transparency and accountability and that an honest review of fundamental national security issues will not be addressed in the QDR, but rather, that the QDR will rather be used to rationalize budgetary and resource allocation decisions which have already been made.

The President's lead for defense is Secretary Robert Gates and he has been quite clear where he thinks the DoD needs to go. So, is the QDR supposed to be a reflection of his vision, or is it supposed to be the independent thoughts of a group of disparate national-security thinkers?

As for me, I think it is the former and not the later. Secretary Gates has presented a consistent path to first win the war we're in and to concurrently prepare for an uncertain future. The fact he was asked to stay on as SecDef almost certainly means he has the total confidence of the President and has been provided an exceedingly long-leash in taking action to shape both current and future activities as they affect the defense community.

For the Air Force, these judgments and decisions have included capping the F-22 program at 187 airframes, procuring more UAV capability, cancelling TSAT, and revitalizing the nuclear enterprise. There is little subtly here--it is all quite plain and clearly announced in speeches and writings.

When we were in the Cold War, we used Cold War strategy, policies, and resourcing decisions. We are now in an era of irregular warfare. While the consequences of war with a near-peer are potentially far more dangerous than IW, the likelihood of that occurrence is less and is a risk the Secretary has assumed. The DoD strategies and priorities he has established will in effect be the QDR and rule the day until other challenges take their places.

Is this QDR being mailed-in? Perhaps, but does it matter?

Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz Visits Air War College

Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, the Director of the National Center for Remote Sensing, Air and Space Law from the University of Mississippi, School of Law came in to brief the Air War College Space Elective today. Fantastic!

South Korean Space Failure

The link reports half the two-piece payload fairing did not separate from the second stage as it should have. The extra weight turned the effort into another sea-sat (maybe a land sat). The fairing issue sounds analogous to the Orbiting Carbon Observatory failure, which rode on an OSC provided Taurus XL.

South Korea Launches Satellite

UPDATE: The first report from the field is always wrong. Spaceflight Now (via the Korea Aerospace Research Institute) reports the orbital parameters were supposed to be perigee at 186 miles and apogee at 932 miles. CNN relayed perigee may have been missed by almost 35 miles. There may be some data mangling regarding miles and kilometers.

ORIGINAL FOLLOWS:

South Korea's Space Launch Vehicle-1, AKA Naro-1 (what, even rockets have street names?) has launched. The two-stage booster was jointly built with the Russians (at a reported cost of $400million) and the satellite was domestically produced in South Korean.

It was announced the launch failed to put its satellite into its desired orbit. The Times report says the satellite was an extra 36 kilometers farther from the earth than it should have been.

Since the announced mission of the satellite was to observe the atmosphere and ocean, and those sorts of missions are often polar orbits, it would seem likely the satellite may not be optimally positioned, but a plus 20-mile miss distance should be able to provide plenty of functionality.

However, if it is supposed to be a low-flier, and maybe even a spy satellite, this sort of miss distance may well prevent mission objectives being fulfilled.

Bring Your Questions for Buzz Aldrin

Certainly an interesting man who has lived an interesting life. He's an Air Force guy, so you gotta dig him.

Commanding Officer of Navy Nuclear Weapons Facility Fired

The dreaded but ambiguous "loss of confidence." For more, check the Global Security Newswire.

Start-Ups Are Poised For Latest Space Race

Andy Pasztor of the WSJ reports the administration is "leaning towards outsourcing major components of its space program." This would mean some competition (or even cancellation!) for the planned NASA-sponsored Ares programs which (in six to eight years) will be used to resupply the International Space Station with materials and astronauts. To paraphrase Emil Faber, "Competition is good."


The Air Force would like the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle to get man-rated. That would allow them to have some of the cost-burden of that program, which was supposed to provide cost savings of at least 25 percent on USAF launches (cue Bob Euker sound-bite: "Just a bit outside") to other users. Likewise, commercial providers like Orbital Sciences, and SpaceX will be in the mix, too. However, don't expect the Ares programs to go down without a fight.


Also, while the President "has confirmed his commitment to human space exploration," the next part of the challenge will be to understand exactly what the President means by 'human space exploration.'


We are already at the point where human space exploration--currently defined by orbiting the earth in the ISS--fails to satisfy. One manned trip to the Moon may satisfy for a short while, but after that...

"Manned space" needs to provide a vision of space travel that is not completely disconnected with reality. Space tourism may be the start. Perhaps the lessons learned in space tourism and the technologies developed in that aspect of the space economy will be applied to the space domain in general. I think it is space's best hope.

Will the Pentagon Thwart Obama's Dream of Zero?

Dude, where's my unicorn?

While nukes are not our future, they are in our future and will be for a very long time.

Nukes will go away when their value is or approaches zero, which will likely mean when they are made obsolete by anti-nuclear methods yet to emerge or are superseded by superior weapons.

Today, people aren't calling for a world without flaming buckets of oil launched via catapult for the same reasons--it’s just no longer the best way to storm the castle.

Similarly, instead of being made obsolete, nuclear weapons could have their value greatly reduced by affecting the efficacy of their delivery systems, via viable missile and air defense systems.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who work directly for the President, is not mentioned anywhere in the article, despite the fact he is known to advocate for the Reliable Replacement Weapon, a modernization effort to ensure the viability of our nuclear deterrent. Part of the concept of deterrence is possessing a consequence should deterrence fail. If a U.S. adversary has no fear of the U.S. nuclear enterprise because the weapons won't work--or because there aren't any--deterrence is obviously greatly reduced.

For all the purported pushback the President is getting regarding the U.S. going to zero nuclear weapons from "generals in the nuclear chain of command," only two are mentioned, General Kevin Chilton, the Commander of USSTRATCOM and USAF Chief of Staff Norton Schwartz. Chilton is critiqued for correcting the assertion U.S. nuclear forces are on a "hair trigger," which those who have experience in the nuclear community know to be untrue. Then, Schwartz is critiqued for agreeing with Chilton. The author suggests these men are somehow disloyal by correcting an error in fact.

The "bolt out of the blue" scenario the author incorrectly characterizes as "launch under attack" is likewise flawed. We have ways of knowing what's going on well before an adversary gets to the point they would be starting a nuclear war, and it’s called posturing. Tensions would likely take a significant amount of time to reach the point nuclear weapons would be considered and all elements of U.S. power would be put to use to avoid war well before a nuclear attack. Because no rational player wants nuclear war, these parties will be exceedingly reasonable and prudent in taking actions to ensure such a thing doesn't happen.

In the end, the issue is not nuclear weapons per se, rather the issue is national security. As such, the real question is not "Should the U.S. pursue a zero nuclear weapons cram-down?" but rather "Is our national security best served by a world with no nuclear weapons?"

If the answer is yes, a follow on is "How do all those holding nuclear weapons get rid of them simultaneously?" with the final question being "How do we ensure they never come back?" If the follow on questions can't be adequately addressed, the goal of a world without nuclear weapons matters not.

As for me, I dream of a world with no cigarettes.

Ares Needs a Death Panel

(Cue Death Star music--not Death Is A Star)

What can I say? They're right.

STSS Readies for Launch

The Delta II booster for STSS, the Space Tracking and Surveillance System, is on the pad and processing towards a 15 Sep launch. Processing can now proceed as the Air Force Delta II for the recent GPS II R-21(M) satellite was on an adjacent pad. With that mission having departed on the morning of 17 Aug, STSS processing is good to go.

STSS is a system of two low-flying satellites and funding has come from the Missile Defense Agency. The program had been cancelled at one point and there is a five year break in press releases at its web site. According to DoD Buzz, STSS will provide a massive breakthrough in tracking equivalencies: equal to about 50 AN/TPY-2s or 20 sea-based x-band radars.

Though this effort was MDA funded, it has very significant space situational awareness (SSA) implications. Having SSA, broadly and informally defined as the ability to understand what's going on in space, is a major Air Force concern and possible growth-area within the space domain.

Exploration plan doesn't fit in current budget, panel says

NASA is underfunded. They need an extra $50 billion or so across the next ten years to do what they're supposed to do.

Given the anticipated national-level direction and funding trend for this sort of discretionary endeavor, NASA should expect to be riding on a man-rated version of the Delta IV and cancel their Ares programs.

There will be little Congressional consensus towards plussing NASA up to perform their "program of record."

And let's consider the ISS as a point of comparison. As Taylor Dinerman reports, the ISS went from an $8 billion program estimate in 1984 to an actual program costing about $100 billion as we speak. So that $50 billion estimate the Augustine panel has come up might well end up being much more than they've anticipated.

Report: NASA can't keep up with killer asteroids

I knew a guy who'd get asteroids so bad he could barely sit down.

In 2005, Congress gave NASA the job of spotting 90 percent of the asteroids and comets that might threaten life across the earth. These are, by definition, considered to be objects 1km or larger and NASA is getting close to fulfilling that responsibility. More recently, Congress also directed NASA to track any objects 140 meters or larger. However, the administration has not requested, nor has Congress provided the funds to fulfill this requirement. As such, NASA is not on track to satisfying that part of the requirement.

The AP article in the headline, derived from a report from the National Academy of Sciences, again brings to mind my first law of space operations: if it ain't funded, it ain't.

It next brings to mind another shortcoming in the congressional mandate itself: if you don't know how many objects there are, with any confidence, how can you task NASA to find 90 percent of them? Wouldn't the first job be to inventory these objects?

Ok, we'll skip that. NASA estimates there are about 20,000 objects in our solar system big enough to have a major "impact" (so to speak) for life on earth. They know where about 6,000 of them are.

For some reason, the U.S. is the only country with an active government-sponsored effort regarding the threat. I'm sure all the rest of the world thinks this is vitally important work, although it is apparently not important enough for them to spend money on. This raises another question: are we right in trying to solve this conundrum, or are they right in letting us serve as bill-payers and try and solve it ourselves?

Besides praying, what would we do if a comet or asteroid were to threaten the earth? Probably wish we'd funded some "space weapons."

China warns of 'arms race in outer space'

Give China full credit for being disingenuous.

First off, define "outer space."

Second, define "arms race."

Third, let's talk about "space weapons." Almost anything that operates in, to, through, or from space can have the effect of being a weapon. Including the space shuttle.

Finally, let's talk about "peaceful purposes" regarding space.

Is it a peaceful use of space if we use the space domain to stop an adversary's nuclear weapons from hitting the United States? Speaking for myself, I'm thinking...yes.

"N0 arms race in outer space" is Chinese code for "no missile defense." China has made a massive investment in short range missiles and many of them are available for use against Taiwan. These missiles are also useful against other neighbors, even if it is just to sustain the existent relationship. China has become very good at manufacturing things, but is not nearly so good at creating complex and networked effects like missile defense. We are in an era where stopping someone (say, China) from doing something (say, threatening neighbors) we don't want them to do is as important and perhaps much more so, as our own ability to kill people and break their stuff.

Navy Wants Top UAV Billing

UAVs will be like cyber. There will be no definitive leader, but there will be multiple users.

Russia sees U.S. space threat, builds new rocket

Wow. I think the problem of lead-based paint contaminating the food and water supplies (and affecting brain function) in at least some parts of Russia may take years to solve.

Russian news agencies quoted the Commander of the Russian Air Force, General Alexander Zelin, as saying the U.S. will have space-based offensive weapons by 2030 that will be able to hit any target in Russia.

Of course, the Russian Defense Ministry had said in June that President Bush had a plan to deploy weapons in space. However, the Russians ignore one critical fact: because there is no funding for a space-weapons program, there is not a space-weapons program.

Zelin points out that Russia is now developing the S-500, a fifth-generation surface to air missile system. I don't doubt that the Russians desire such a system, but given the non-success of their Bulava SLBM, I'll take a wait and see approach.

Someone Left The Space Out In The Rain

This article first appeared in Air University's The Wright Stuff.

While there are a number of truly awful songs in the inventory of the mind, one of the worst-ever all-timers has to be Richard Harris’ 1968 version of MacArthur Park. In MacArthur Park, Harris evokes the spirit of the true karaoke B-teamer; not nearly as bad as William Hung, but certainly not good, and perhaps more reminiscent of William Shatner’s later-arriving spoken-word version of Rocket Man. While MacArthur Park remains an interesting piece of work musically, the lyrical content is particularly, uh…unusual, especially the semi-famous stanza “MacArthur Park is melting in the dark, oh the sweet green icing flowing down. Someone left the cake out in the rain. I don’t think that I can take it, ‘cause it took so long to make it, and I’ll never have the recipe again.” So what do these bad lyrics have to do with today’s state of affairs? The last line, “I’ll never have the recipe again,” particularly brings to mind two recent events. The first is the 40th anniversary of the Apollo 11 moon walk.

There are no doubt plenty of space advocates who wonder if the U.S. still has the “recipe” to ever achieve another manned lunar landing. There are others who will claim in no uncertain terms that we still have that recipe, but this compellingly brings up the follow-on question:“why?” While there is a lot of hand-wringing about the retirement of the space shuttle, it has done remarkably little to enhance U.S. space leadership. Generally our manned space program has been constrained to providing things like tune-ups for the aged Hubble Space Telescope or more likely, a ride to the International Space Station. The ISS itself is a low-value (but not low-cost) piece of space debris in search of a meaningful mission. Even consider the moniker the International Space Station. As Dennis Miller used to opine, this is similar to adding International in front of the otherwise unsexy yet functionally descriptive House of Pancakes. But I digress--the slide rule generation has left the building--who, if anyone, will be interested in taking their places?

The second “loss of recipe” regards an essential national security topic, in this case, nuclear weapons. Several months ago the GSA reported that the manufacturing know-how for a product called Fogbank, made at the Y-12 complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee had been lost. Fogbank was made from 1975 until 1989 and is alleged to be a necessary part of the W76 nuclear weapon which rides on the Navy’s Trident II sea-launched ballistic missiles. In the case of Fogbank, it seems the recipe was literally lost (or thrown away). Recapturing that knowledge cost close to $100 million and was no doubt a daunting challenge for today’s scientists and engineers who chances are, had to seek some gray-beard support.

Even the Russians are not immune to losing their recipe mojo. A test of their sub-launched Bulava ICBM failed again earlier this month. This is the sixth acknowledged failure in eleven launch attempts and it occurred about 28 seconds into launch. By the way, the Russians hate our missile defense programs. This is first because they work and might one day be capable of totally neutering their ICBMs, but also because they seem to motivate Russia to try and recapture their past-superpower glories – unfortunately and embarrassingly to demonstrate their catastrophic ineptness. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has stated he has a 90-percent plus confidence in the U.S. missile defense system. The Russians are now estimated to be spending about one-quarter of their defense budget--money they don’t have--on nuclear weapon and nuclear-delivery systems. Reset, anyone?

While some are concerned about China and India as they are diligently working to create robust manned space programs, there is no way we can stop them, nor should we. For the U.S., our manned space flight program has proven to be a particularly poor investment--essentially a “stunt” program--which was always all about looking good in the shower vis-à-vis the USSR versus providing productive capabilities. While flowery manned space flight language like “to inspire current and future generations” sounded great and served a purpose in its time, future manned space exploration must have a better purpose.

Manned space flight has traditionally lacked an “in order to” imperative. This is because robotic space exploration, with satellites that don’t need air, water, food, or space toilets seem to be doing the job cheaper, faster, and better. Additionally, while finding out about the universe or looking for alien life forms is no doubt fascinating --creating a large intellectual sand-box for scientists to play in--again, it should be accomplished for a purpose. You don’t run diagnostics on your car, computer, or even your body for fun, you do it for a purpose, normally to make it work better. Unmanned space, however--using satellites--provides weather, communications, surveillance, and positioning, navigation, and timing. Look at GPS; unmanned space has proven itself highly valuable in making things work better; manned space has not.

Axis-of-evil states like North Korea and Iran now have space programs--they’re called missiles--with North Korea already having tested nuclear weapons and Iran well on the way. So tell me again how anyone can not be for missile defense? It sure beats MacArthur Park melting in the dark.

MacArthur Park, penned by composer Jimmy Webb, was dramatically improved with Donna Summers’ 1978 cover, resulting in a massive move forward in listenability. The Summers’ version itself follows a common-to-life pattern: over time, things normally get better…but only with effort. Songs, materials, and services like missile defense generally improve, and sometimes the music does as well, provided you keep the recipe well within reach. In music, as in life, if you don’t use it you lose it.

Mark Stout is a researcher at Air University’s National Space Studies Center. The opinions expressed here are the author’s alone and may not reflect the views and policies of the US Air Force or the Department of Defense.

Is Policy Overrated?

If policy is a "goal or aim of government or society," (my informal definition), it is important to bear in mind that goals and aims change all the time. It is also important that "government" also changes over every once in a while. So while I'm not trying to say policy can be dismissed or that we shouldn't have it, to me, its analogous to eating more fruit and vegetables. It generally falls into the "no kidding?" bin.

I recently read an article at The Space Review entitled Elements of a 21st century space policy. Based on what I've already described to you, you can probably imaging that I'm not crazy about the article. I can agree with about 15 percent of it, disagree with about a third, and am ambivalent on the final half. Forgive the rounding error, but its in spec.

The part I agree with has to do with the essential nature of stable and adequate funding for space systems. First, let's be real. To quote myself and many others throughout time, if it ain't funded, it ain't. Next, I can also get behind the article's idea of encouraging commercial enterprise in space, to include property rights. If there are no property rights in space, what is the incentive to build anything with such a low (or negative) return on investment? The whole galaxy doesn't have to be given away a la the railroads and westward expansion, but the fundamental issue of 'what's in it for me?' for the entrepreneur and capitalist should never be dismissed. Cash for comets anyone?

Now, on the other hand...

Mechanically, the article is filled with distracting elements of weirdness, jargon, and gibberish. This includes a quote from Parag Khanna (Who? The guy may have a 20-pound brain, but he's not Britney Spears. Introduce him!) and wonkish phrases like "broad brushstrokes" (groan), and "auto-catalytic development."

Next, the article defers excessively to internationalism and cooperation. Those things are fine as long as they don't interfere with national needs. However, there is a reason current policy is titled U.S. National Space Policy.

Finally, the article seems to think existing U.S. space policy lacks efficacy because of its belligerent tone. That tone, while way too plain spoken, doesn't make the current policy lack efficacy. Instead, what the policy is missing is an executable nature. It simply says the U.S. will do things it either can't or won't. Or both. If our space policy did what it suggested, China would absolutely freak-out. Notice they are much more freaked out about the U.S. economy, borrowing, and the dollar than they are about space.

Since I like to end on a positive note, I'll tentatively endorse the importance the author assigns to space tourism. For space to be most fully exploited, we need a breakthrough in the ways we get to space. I view space tourism as the most likely method for this to happen. Government programs tend to refine existent technologies and current propulsion systems haven't changed too much since Bob Goddard's time. Cheaper access to space is a valuable goal and our current space community (civil, military, and commercial) can be expected to keep doing what they've been doing. The breakout will have to come from somewhere else, and it may well be the space tourism industry.

When a new U.S. National Space Policy is issued, I hope the tone to the world is a little less sterile and a bit...friskier. Along the lines of "Here's what we want to do with regard to space. Wanna go with us?" Policy that over-promises is bound to under-deliver, so a reality-constrained policy is what I'd prefer to see when it gets renewed. Otherwise, people just look at it and say "those goals are not achievable" and lose interest.

Russian subs near US coast pose no threat: Pentagon

Have you ever wondered how we square the presence of Russian subs with the Monroe Doctrine? Nuclear weapons on land in Cuba are not acceptable, but those in the water are waived off.

Just one of those things...

$100,000 Tool Bag Lost in Space Is Found ... Sort Of

Just a thought from a long ago missile accident involving a Titan II ICBM near Damascus, Arkansas: has it occurred to anyone to tether their tools while on a space walk?

Fund It Or Kill It

During the mid and late 1990s, when we were reaping the benefits of the peace dividend, I first heard an ancient and wise programmer (someone who runs a DoD program or series of programs, not a software person) use the mathematical phrase D + I = O. For the uninitiated, that was shorthand for "disconnects plus initiatives equals offsets."

In a era of no DoD budget growth, as the 1990s generally were, any broken or flawed programs (disconnects) or any new programs (initiatives) had to be "paid for" with money coming out of other programs (offsets). This sort of mindset led to money coming out of previously healthy programs with the here-to-for healthy programs themselves becoming chronically drug-out and broken. A planned five year program at $85 million would end up taking eight years and costing $135 million; a 15-year program would take 20.

It was all because the program, previously healthy, now had money taken out of it in order to make something else "executable" or healthy, with the unintended and ironic effect of the previously healthy program then becoming disconnected itself. Basically, programs that are not adequately funded cannot be expected to meet performance, cost, or schedule parameters.

Now, DoD has told the services to come up with $50-60 billion across the next 5-6 years for the purpose of providing "initiative" money for new programs that will fill capabilities gaps. This is not inherently evil, because priorities can and do change, and funding needs to change to match. The sad part is the programs that are "marked" to provide offsets are almost never killed. As such, they just limp along, needing more and more money put into them as them move towards completion, which will almost always be much later than desired.

The taskings to the services should rather be to kill enough programs to save $60 billion across the FYDP. Programs that come in missing the mark on performance, schedule, and cost often do so due to funding instability. While it is really difficult to kill a program, it often makes the most sense to do just that rather than allow it to exist on the margins, where it will be doomed to fail, falling short of providing a particular capability by a certain time. Leadership is all about establishing priorities, and when every program is important enough to save, all programs pay the price.