Showdown At Big Sky

Having reached a not-to-exceed measure of largeness, I have decided to run more. By the way, it is hot here in Alabama. I mean Tarzan couldn't take it, its so hot. Anyway, I've retained an old habit, which is to run with music. Running without music is like farming without tractors. Yeah, you can do it, but it is definitely much more difficult.

So the 1987 Robbie Robertson tune Showdown at Big Sky came up on my shuffle (which not only describes my pace, but also my music machine) and as I listened to the words during a cool-down, I realized Showdown really must be considered as a fully qualified Song of Space and Nuclear War. Although the song is now old enough to drink, Robertson sings insightfully of the era's soon to end Cold War's threats including the big bang, the weapons race, darkness at high noon, and the fact any moment could be our last. Finally, he opines on our need for strength, wisdom, and morality--makes me think about Iran and North Korea today. I'd say Robbie's overall tone was one of concern without being overwhelmed or defeated. Check out the lyrics for yourself.

I had ordered Robertson's CD back in the day when it was new (I had heard Showdown at Big Sky or seen the video, or something and was attracted to it), and I ordered it as a part of my initial buy in the Columbia House Record (not kidding) Club. It was supposed to be in my first delivery lump of 12 or 13 CDs. They all showed up uneventfully, except for one, the Robertson CD, which was inexplicably empty. I never called or wrote to Columbia House--I didn't think it would do any good--but the empty jewel box haunted me for years (but not enough to buy another copy). Not too long ago, I bought Showdown off iTunes or Amazon. I have a to-buy list but I'm pretty much 'bought out.' The only remaining stuff I want is either not digitized or only sold as an "album." I still have stacks of albums that I bought just to get one song.

U.S. Spaceflight Gap Wider Than Thought

The bottom line: the shuttle won't retire on time and its replacement won't be ready on time. Those are some preliminary findings of the U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee, led by Norm Augustine and briefed by former astronaut Sally Ride.

In total, the delays could add another year without a U.S. provided ride to the ISS. That gap could be mitigated by adding one or more shuttle missions. Man-rating the Delta IV EELV won't change the timelines appreciably.

The ISS may be a beneficiary of this review. The ISS is planned for deorbit in 2016, but the panel seems poised to advocate it stay on orbit longer. Why? Because the planned deorbit might hurt NASA partners and "U.S. leadership in space."

I cringe at that type of attitude. Rather, what should be considered is how (or if) our partners are helping us achieve the ISS's objectives and what could be done if we didn't have to support the money-sucking ISS.

Intel Lawmaker Urges NRO Fixes

Well, certainly no man-bites-dog story here, as the NRO has struggled mightily for the last decade or so.

The story leads by describing the NRO as a builder of satellites. Please. They are a buyer of satellites. Industry builds them.

Air Force: NASA's New Rocket Unsafe for Astronauts

The Air Force thinks the crew escape capsule for the shuttle replacement, known as the Ares I, will not allow the crew to escape if a low-altitude disaster were to occur. Given the capsule's nylon parachutes might well have to fly through a massive debris-field of flaming chunks of solid rocket motor, that seems reasonable.

Historically, the crew escape module is analogous to a very expensive good luck charm--it really is not up to getting the job done and is rather a kind of tool to ease the astronaut's cognitive dissonance about a near-ground (in this scenario, about 30 to 60 seconds into the flight profile) mishap. What does the shuttle have, you ask? Nothing. Remember? It was engineered to fail only once every 10,000 missions.

NASA says the Air Force's sample size in coming to this conclusion--one mishap involving a Titan IV in 1998--is too small.

A lesson is when you man-rate anything, the costs go through the roof. Likewise, there is no reasonable way to plan for every contingency.

F-35 Fighter Two Years Behind Schedule: Pentagon Panel

The Joint Estimate Team (JET), which is described as "probably more reliable than the (Joint Strike Fighter) program office" has offered findings that say the F-35 is two years behind schedule. If true, this delay could add as much as $7.4 billion in costs to the Joint Strike Fighter program. On the other hand, according to the GAO, accelerating the JSF program--like DoD is talking about doing--could cost up to an additional $33.4 billion. Compared to the $1.75 billion the Senate decided to take out of the F-22 program the other day, these are significant.

The JSF program office has not changed the official production schedule, which calls for full rate production in 2014. The JET thinks 2016 is when that milestone will really occur.

It is often said bad news ages poorly. House appropriators appear to favor the JET's argument--the appropriators reduced the JSF request for FY2010 by $530 million because they don't' think the program can spend all the money it has asked for.

Will this bad news affect the F-22 in any way? And what to make of the fact this information was released only after the Senate's recent F-22 vote? Stay tuned...

Don't Worry So Much About Iran's Nukes

Although ostensibly about Iran, the punch line comes after a long build up: Pakistan has at least 60 nuclear weapons and they are "the most frightening nuclear challenge we're facing."

Sigh. This is one of those articles that counsels the administration to deal with the world as it should be versus as it actually is. Even if you agree with the author's assertion that we should be more concerned about Pakistan, this is the real world and either/or are not the only options.

The way things are, of course, is that Iran is on track to have a nuclear weapon. Some say testing could be done as soon as six-months.

Maybe The F-22 Was Not Shovel Ready?

Possible future growth in the F-22 program suffered what may well turn out to be a fatal blow in the Senate yesterday. In a lopsided 58-40 vote, the Senate accepted an amendment which would cap the program at 187 airframes, the same number currently envisioned in the President’s FY2010 budget submission. Other efforts to plus the program up had been politically pursued--this is likely to end any program growth.

The F-22 follows the model established by the B-2. The B-2 was first planned for a 132 airframe buy. By the time the last plane was delivered, there were only 20 in the USAF inventory.

Any discussion of the current status of the F-22 has to start with Secretary Gates. As a holdover from the Bush administration, it is reasonable to assume he wanted the FY2010 defense budget to have his personal stamp on it, which included marking a “Cold War” program like the F-22. He almost certainly expected both a long leash and top cover from the current administration. Having Gates on the Obama team would in fact be useful in burnishing their defense resume, given the Secretary's significant personal and professional credibility. In return, he would need to have the administration’s support for his positions. As such, having a true “Gates budget” was likely a condition of employment. Likewise, when the SecDef wanted a new Chief of Staff of the Air Force and a new Secretary of the Air Force, their support of the Defense Department’s emerging funding priorities was also likely a condition of employment. The Air Force seems to have read the writing on the wall as seen by the recently released UAV flight plan.

What does the Senate’s F-22 vote mean?

First, the administration picked a fight they knew they had an outstanding chance of winning.

Next, when the pushback was more vigorous than perhaps first imagined, they doubled down with a full-court press from every direction, including the JCS, Air Force leadership, and the media.

Finally, the President now owns the Afghanistan war, and he wants to shape it with resources more likely to bring success. Given the current state of that conflict and expected future movement, more UAVs will be the USAF’s contribution and F-22s would not have helped in that fight.

Celebrity Culture vs. The Right Stuff

WSJ's Bret Stephens uses the 4oth anniversary of the Apollo 11 moonwalk as a springboard into the topic of American celebrity culture.

While I'm not sold on the utility of manned spaceflight, there is no denying the teamwork, courage, and honor America's men-in-space displayed. They did things that made space real for us in an era when the high-value products space provided were not even acknowledged as "national technical means."

The space culture values composure under pressure. The celebrity culture values decomposure under pressure. Reality TV in 1969 was Apollo 11. Reality TV today is an oxymoron.

Space Program Struggles for Direction

Struggles for direction is an apt characterization, but it the article should be titled "Manned Space Program Struggles for Direction." The next article in the series could then be Military Space Program Struggles With Affordability.

Just a thought.

Time to Boldly Go Once More

Former astronaut Buzz Aldrin makes an emotional plea for U.S. space leadership with a goal of establishing an American colony on Mars.

The major shortfall in his plea is why we should do this. While Aldrin uses traditional space advocate language like "galvanize public support," "inspire America's young students," and "renew our space industry," that agreement is as vacuous as the self-licking ice cream cone. If he said "to make life on earth better for Americans by providing revolutionary improvements in energy" (for example) it would be quite a bit easier to get behind.

Additionally, the Outer Space Treaty appears unsupportive of an American colony on Mars, as it says "outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means." Is an American colony on Mars "use or occupation"?

A better offer would be to create a new Outer Space Treaty which would allow for the creation of property rights and sovereignty claims in order to incentivize private citizens, industry, and consortiums to explore space for a purpose other than...exploring it.

Finally, as with many of his era, Mr. Aldrin proposes we explore space as part of an international coalition and for the benefit of all mankind. That is little more than code for U.S. taxpayers providing for free-riders to benefit from space. China holds about $2 trillion in U.S. currency--if they want to play, let 'em pay.

I think Mr. Aldrin perhaps stands a little too close to the issue.

Space As A Contested Domain

The National Space Studies Center will be leading a seminar and attending the Air Education and Training Command's Symposium in January 2010.

Our focus will be on Space As A Contested Environment, which is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Area of Emphasis.

Feel free to visit

http://space.au.af.mil/symposium

or

http://www.aetcsymposium.com

Former 'N Sync member Lance Bass still hopes to go into space

Lance, all it takes is time and money.

Obama Puts Arms Control at Core of New Strategy

I'm not sure why the WSJ ran this article. It will not provide any profound insights and contains a number of non sequiturs. The title is eye-catching (well, to some), but the lead paragraph immediately launches into nuclear deterrence, which we know from our studies is not the same as arms control. The article's purpose is further opaqueified when it then moves into the human rights arena.

Author Peter Spiegel points out the administration's attempt to link human-rights and U.S. democratization efforts, using President Ronald Reagan as a model, since he "engaged with Soviet leaders on arms control even as he condemned their human-rights record." Left unsaid was that President Reagan was able to engage from a position of strength, having plussed-up the nation's nuclear capabilities with the Pershing II , Ground Launched Cruise Missile and Peacekeeper ICBM. systems.

The take-away is the assessment by Brent Scowcroft, who thinks the world is at a tipping point regarding nuclear proliferation. If Iran goes nuclear (anyone think they won't?), will Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey follow? North Korea's already gone nuclear and Japan has responded by buying more missile defense. Will they reach a point when they go nuclear, too?

Obama's Space Policy Review

Amy Klamper, writing for Space News (subscription required) has said President Obama has given his administration until 1 Oct to review the existing U.S. Space Policy, which was issued under the Bush administration in 2006.

Given the tone of the administration in the article, expect any revised space policy to de-emphasize national security space and to emphasize commercial space, cooperation, and "no kidding" issues like mitigating space debris, space situational awareness, and improving the industrial base. Don't expect any discussion regarding "space weapons," whatever they are. During the campaign, Obama endorsed a ban on space weapons--that statement has since been removed from the White House web site.

While space policy is interesting, space funding is important.

Will The F-22 Destroy The USAF?

R. Jeffrey Smith's WaPo article has so much that should be discussed. Here are a few things that come to mind:

• F-22 maintenance costs per flying hour are about 150% of the F-15. Ok, but is the F-22 twice again as good? That is, if we only need half as many F-22s, that would make it a bargain, right?


• Most importantly, will the plane's massive cost preempt most other USAF modernization, driving the Air Force towards long-term obsolescence? Will this create what former Pentagon tester Thomas Christie characterises as "unilateral disarmament"?


• The prime, Lockheed, farmed out over 1,000 subcontracts to vendors in more than 40 states. Everyone can feed at the F-22 trough and cancellation becomes much more difficult.


• Former OSD Comptroller John Hamre says the F-22 program was approved despite the fact it was underfunded. Telling Congress what the real costs were would have been politically unpalatable.


• One unnamed DoD official says its a disgrace the F-22 can only fly 1.7 hours on average before it has a critical failure. I'm thinking that official is one of the folks who supports capping the program at 187 planes.

In many ways the F-22 is emblematic of almost all our space systems. It has the characteristics of an exquisite system that make it difficult to design, engineer, build, and employ.

Imagine A World Without Information

A world without information is what it will take to achieve the President's stated goal of a world without nuclear weapons. That's because the information for nuclear weapons exists and given the terrible utility of nuclear weapons, it seems reasonable to think there are and will always be parties interested in pursuing that information to achieve knowledge and thereby increase their power. Theorists posit that information seeks to be freed--and free—and while it may be misapplied, laid aside, or even forgotten, it does not cease to exist. Information enables knowledge, which likewise enables all the precursor steps that are required to create nuclear weapons, whether they are associated with nuclear power production, precision manufacturing, industrial development, science and engineering, or computational power.

The President has been both applauded and chided for his recent vision for a world without nuclear weapons. Applauded by the anti-nuclear/anti-defense community who support his vision, but chided by those who in an ironic twist, would be called the realists, something the President would perhaps describe himself as. Often uncommented on by the no-nukes advocates is the fact President's position is effectively endorsed by Russian and China, and is no doubt a source of great, if tacit, joy from emerging nuclear weapons powers North Korea and Iran. After all, if the U.S. will only disarm, other nations' power and leverage relative to the U.S. is bound to increase. For Russia, until oil prices rise, they can neither pay for the creaky nuclear enterprise they have, nor modernize. Ignore what they say--that they will modernize--and watch what they do.

The United States is at a point in history where there it seems imprudent to draw down its strategic nuclear forces or delivery systems. While there is trade-space for discussion--if it unarguably benefits our national security--the President should consider the medical maxim: first, do no harm.

Space Traffic and The Growing Space Surveillance Mission

Air Force Space Command is responding to the on-orbit collision of a dead but still orbiting Russian Cosmos satellite and a functional Iridium satellite back in February 2009. The response includes plussing-up the number of operators working conjunction analysis from five to nine. Eventually AFSPC is looking at a 24-person staff to perform this mission which as currently envisioned, will support collision analysis of 800 maneuverable satellites. At the time of the collision, only about 140 satellites were being monitored for possible collisions.

Enhanced space surveillance will also involve hardware: more servers and computational power, of course, but also the new $1B Space Fence, which is planned to be employed in 2015 and the near-term Space-Based Space Surveillance satellite, which is to surveil each satellite residing in the geosynchronous belt once a day.

The Cosmos-Iridium event was indicative of Space Command's less-capable-than-desired space surveillance and conjunction analysis capabilities. According to Lt Gen Larry James, AFSPC wants to eventually be able and track everything in space from launch to deorbit. All it takes is time and money...

ITAR and the Law of Unintended Condequences

ITAR--the International Traffic in Arms Regulation--is the guidance intended to keep U.S. businesses from selling potential adversaries the proverbial ropes from which they would hang us. To say the least, ITAR is a business-unfriendly, rule intensive, and cumbersome process. Now it seems ITAR is up for a wire brushing.

Within the defense industry, ITAR has become an industry-wide pariah--something approaching "it whose name cannot be spoken." The U.S. space industry--and in particular, space launch--have especially demonized ITAR, as huge chunks of market have been lost to foreign competitors. It probably doesn't help that State runs ITAR.

Is it possible the U.S. space industry has confused correlation with causation? The answer can't be known with certainty, but GM and Chrysler do come to mind.

Tanks For The Memories. Kenya Dig It?

Piracy has been joined by intelligence in the fee-for-service realm. Anyone, or any nation-state, with a credit card now has an excellent chance to buy top-notch overheads. Add analysis in the form of people paying attention and bam! you have intel.

Cyber Can Kill SAMs

Things that make you go hmmmm.

Mail In The Nuclear Posture Review?

Tally ho on the reset button? Well, at one level, it may appear so.

Per public law, the purpose of the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review is to establish U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, strategy, and force posture for the next 5 to 10 years. It seems unclear how the NPR's call for a measured, deliberate, consultative, and "whole of government" approach squares with the President's proclamation that U.S. nuclear forces will be categorically reduced.

Satellite, Writ Large

The 15,000-plus pound TerreStar satellite, about the size of a small school bus, is now on orbit. According to the satellite's manufacturer, Loral, over a million man-hours went into its creation. The satellite is designed to serve North America with "blended" terrestrial and space based communications and provide better service than either method alone.

Turn And Face The Strain--Ch-Ch-Changes

Philosopher-savant Forest Gump gave a reasonable analogy regarding the global security environment with the now ubiquitous “you never know what you’re gonna get.” With the world now trending towards less stability and more interdependence, with lot of wicked problems, fundamental questions regarding how much security is needed, how much can we afford, and what can we do are moving towards the front of people's thinking.

To address the issue, at least in part, the Defense Science Board (DSB) was chartered to examine what was referred to as “capability surprise” which looked at an adversary’s ability to generate capabilities that were unexpected or unanticipated. With the DSB release of its report which will address the broader issue of surprise, along with assessments and recommendations to 1) evaluate the surprise mechanisms, 2) reduce the potential for surprise, 3) better prepare to respond to surprise, and 4) look at rapid, unique, and cost-effective ways the U.S. might impose surprise on adversaries.

Surprises are inevitable, but although the future is inherently unknowable, that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t do anything about it. In the DSB report, ten items are listed as reasons why the U.S.--and just about anyone else, for that matter--gets “strategically surprised.” Depending on how you categorize these items, most of the reasons for surprise can be described as risk assessment or judgment failures. A couple of the reasons for surprise are attributable to the failures of our own imaginations, and only one is due to an awareness shortcoming. So if the DSB’s assessments are correct, at least by category, this means almost all the nation’s security surprises are due to improperly assessing the information already available, as opposed to breakdowns in technical intelligence or a lack of information.

So just how do we keep ourselves from being surprised? To paraphrase portions of a recent leadership polemic, if America wants to avoid surprise, it needs to create systems that develop and reward the characteristics that help avoid surprise. That is, it must create incentives within the Department of Defense and the Services which fully develop and value honesty and openness, enhance judgment and assessments, and improve imagination among its individual members. At the same time, the system has to be able to accurately sort through a global pipeline of noise, data, and clutter. Identifying what needs to be done conceptually is the easy part--the hard part is figuring out just how to do these things and who leads and who follows.

Organizationally, changing a massive bureaucracy like DoD towards avoiding surprise has great obstacles. They include chain of command (who works for who), organizational issues (the generally separate and distinct capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities each group possesses), and differing institutional cultures. For each individual within the huge national defense team, avoiding surprise leads to subjects like career paths, self-mastery, and an attitude embracing lifelong learning, to include coaching, teaching, mentoring, and language skills. While Secretary Gates has laid out his ideas to address future threats (a balanced force; having allies and host nations carry more of the burden; more soft power; etc.), these are largely ways of responding to challenges, and tend to only deal indirectly with avoiding surprise.

If we reap what we sow, what will DoD and the military branches have to sow in order to reap improved creativity, maturity of thought, and more fully developed skills needed to enhance national security? Conversely, if we keep doing what we’re doing, we’ll keep reaping what has already been sown, to the detriment of our ability to address the issue of “surprise.” Emblematic of this concern is the defense acquisition system, which moves at a glacial pace, and often culminates in products that are over budget and obsolete.

Apart from creating a system that rewards creativity, maturity of thought, and essential skills--that'll be hard--what else can be done to reduce surprise? The DSB will certainly endorse some of the usual suspects, including more meaningful red-teaming, war-gaming, exercises, and experimentation; the continued or increased use of gray-beards (after all, that’s what the DSB is); attempts to more rapidly field new capabilities; and, of course, organizational changes. Effectiveness has to retain its paramount position, but a massive push for efficiency in fielding capabilities should also be required, although the details are devilish.

While total control all factors involved is an illusion, influence over them is achievable. A world full of wicked problems has no easy, stop, reset, or uninvent buttons to push, regardless of the desire to reduce and simplify. While the military services understand their need to think through problems, the disconnect is we’re convinced we already do. Convincing the DoD to actually accomplish what it already says it does is – to use another farming term – a long row to hoe. Sometimes it’s not what you don’t know that will kill you; it’s what you think you know that isn’t really true.

GPS, Unlike Scotland, Is Not Free

This article originally appeared in Air University's The Wright Stuff.

The Press Ain't Free, Its Expensive

This is sad and pathetic. For fees ranging between $25,000 to $250,000, the Washington Post will provide access to government and media insiders. It should be some sort of man-bites-dog story, but instead it is simply a confirmation--if more stupidly accomplished and disgraceful--of both the traditions and the challenges of the old media.

If You Fund It, They Will Come

The U.S. National Space Policy says the government shall use U.S. commercial space capabilities and services to the maximum practical extent, to include purchasing commercial capabilities and services when available and meeting needs.

Regarding communications and followed to a logical extreme, that policy direction means that most and perhaps all space-based military communications should be commercially provided. To meet that need, U.S. Space LLC is trying to get their nose under the tent and provide services that are both responsive and meet military needs. Traditional "exquisite" satellite capabilities--especially for something like comm, which has taken on commodity-like characteristics--won't cut it, and if you don't believe it, take a look at the demise of TSAT in the FY10 President's Budget.

If Boeing, Northrup-Grumman, and Lockheed-Martin are the Infinity, Lexus and BMW of the space industry, U.S. Space appears to be looking to be the Hyundai...domestically produced, of course.

Fade To Black For The NRO?

Colin Clark at DoD Buzz reports on the most recent blue-ribbon panel to review the NRO. While the panel has compiled their results and presented them to Dennis Blair, the DNI, it will be interesting to see if they opt for revolution or evolution. Many of the panel's members have deep ties to the NRO and the intelligence community. Regardless of the panel's recommendations, something well short of turning out the lights is likely.

History certainly favors evolution over revolution, and if so, things will likely only be changed in the margins--nothing dramatic. This will be useful in deflecting sustained criticism away from the NRO from Congressional overseers, as currently embodied by the Senate Intelligence Committee and its staff and in providing some cover to make incremental changes that will enhance the NRO's effectiveness.

Don't Ask, Don't Tell

Don’t ask, don’t tell has more lives than a vampire. For both supporters and detractors, it’s been something like living with cancer—perhaps painful, although things could be worse.

In statements recently attributed to Secretary of Defense Gates, Stars and Stripes reported the Defense Department is “looking at flexibility in how we apply this (Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell) law” to include “seeing if there is a more humane way to apply the law until it gets changed.”

To date, Gates has been a successful SecDef for several reasons. First, he is fundamentally capable and articulate. Second, he has a vision. Third, he came after Secretary Rumsfeld and was able to harvest the Congressional and media good will associated with not being Donald Rumsfeld. Finally, Gates is politically astute, and tends to work with Congress rather than against them. Because the DoD cannot escape politics, Gates no doubt feels that taking a stand against anything other than the full legal endorsement of gays in the military is analogous to holding back the tides. His comments were less than a week after 77 House Democrats asked the President to stop enforcing the ban on homosexuals openly serving in the military.